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Abstract 
This paper discusses the relationship between sport and tourism in reference to a 
specific hallmark event, the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) 
2002 Football World Cup. In particular, it investigates the terrorism related issues that 
affected the event and the possible implications for future mega sporting events in 
Australia. It seeks to contribute to understanding spectator experiences of this 
event by understanding perceptions of safety and responses to security measures. A 
questionnaire survey of a convenience based sample of World Cup spectators in the 
Republic of Korea was undertaken to determine: the extent to which the terrorist 
attacks on the United States of America on 11 September, 2001 changed these sport 
tourists’ motivations to attend the event; how safe they felt in Korea during the World 
Cup; and how risk management measures taken by the event organisers impacted on 
the tourists’ level of enjoyment.  The findings are discussed in the context of sport 
event management, concluding with consequences for the future organisation of 
sports events. While this study focussed on the impact of an act of terrorism, it is 
suggested that the implications for other critical incidences with global ramifications, 
such as the recent war in Iraq and the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 






The forces of globalisation have both positively and adversely affected many 
facets of postmodern culture, including both the sport and tourist industries. Not only 
has the scope and reach of these two industries been changed, but the relationship 
between them has been strengthened. During the past three decades there has been a 
marked transformation in the sport industry’s relationship to tourism, particularly via 
the growth of sport tourism. This confluence represents multiple and overlapping 
intersections at local, national, regional and global levels and highlights sport as a 
touristic activity (Hinch & Higham, 2001). 
 
Sport tourism encompasses a range of activities. Hall (1992) identified three 
domains of sport tourism: hallmark events; health and fitness; and outdoor recreation. 
It is the domain of hallmark events which has provided much of the impetus for large-
scale sport tourism. This paper discusses the relationship between sport and tourism; 
in reference to a specific hallmark event, the Fédération Internationale de Football 
Association (FIFA) 2002 Football World Cup.  Rather than focussing on the impact of 
the event on the host countries of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and Japan, it 
examines the perceived impacts of the external threats of terrorism on the levels of 
enjoyment and satisfaction of spectators in Korea. In particular, it discusses the global 
effects of acts of terrorism on sport tourism.  
 
Primary research was undertaken to determine to what extent the terrorist 
attack on the twin towers of the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in 
Washington, on 11 September, 2001 (known colloquially as 911) changed sport 
tourists’ motivations to attend the event, how safe the tourists felt in Korea during the 
World Cup, and how risk management measures taken by the event organisers 
impacted on the tourists’ level of enjoyment during games.  This particular group of 
sport tourists was investigated because ‘individuals who actually attend a World Cup 
event are a very specialized travel group and may provide considerable insight about 
travel motivations’ (Wicks, 2002: 129). In terms of background to the study the 
following key elements are outlined: sport tourism; terrorism; provide examples of the 
effects of terrorism on sport; and demonstrate how this relates to Australia’s growing 
sporting mega-event industry. Information regarding the 2002 World Cup is presented 
to provide the specific context for the study.  
 
The data was gathered through a questionnaire survey of a convenience based 
sample of World Cup spectators in the Republic of Korea. The findings are discussed 
in a framework of sport event management, concluding with suggestions made for the 
future organization of such events, especially in an Australian context. While this 
study focussed on the impact of an act of terrorism, the need for risk management 
measures to deal with such major episodes would be similar for other critical 
incidences with global ramifications, such as the recent war in Iraq and Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). 
 
Relevance to Australia 
Australia is a Western liberal democracy with historical ties, and cultural and 
political affinities to North America and Europe, especially Great Britain. Being 
geographically removed from these two major influencers, it is a country that, in the 
past, has suffered from a tyranny of distance. However, the effects of this isolation 
have been diminishing, concurrent to the development of globalisation. While it is 
located in the Asia-Pacific region, it has only recently begun a policy of active 
engagement with Asia. One obvious industry that has been transformed through this 
process is travel, with subsequent growth effects on Australian inbound and outbound 
journeys. Similarly, global political issues have impacted the nation more 
immediately, not only because of advances in telecommunications technology, but 
also because of Australia’s increasing involvement in global affairs (Australian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2003). 
 
Thus, the issue of terrorism is currently in the minds of many Australians and 
is still regularly capturing headlines in the Australian media, almost two years after 
911.  The plane hijackings and twin towers attacks were on the other side of the globe, 
yet it is estimated that 15 Australian nationals died as a result. More recently, three 
bomb blasts in Bali killed a further 88 Australians and injured over 100 more. 
According to The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), 
(2003:3): ‘the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States and 12 
October 2002 in Bali have been defining events. They have changed Australia's 
security environment in significant ways. They starkly demonstrated that threats to 
Australia's security can be global as well as regional’.  
 
Many of the Bali victims were sports tourists; football teams and their 
supporters on their post-season trips to the popular Indonesian tourist destination. 
These tourists were drinking and dancing in the Sari Club and Paddy’s Bar, the sites 
of the first two bombs; nightspots well known and popular with Australians on 
holiday in the town of Kuta. Subsequently, it has been revealed that the timing of the 
blast was designed to specifically target these sports tourists (Miller, 2003). The group 
accused of the bombings is Jamaah Islamiyah, an organization with supposed links to 
al-Qaeda, the alleged perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks. 
 
These attacks heightened the awareness of many politicians and the public 
alike to the possibility that a future terrorist attack may occur in Australia. In 
particular, the threat of terrorism has been linked by the federal government to: the 
ongoing and divisive issue of immigration; the growing number of Muslim asylum 
seekers trying to enter the country illegally by boat (people smuggling); and 
Australia’s support of the United States in its ‘war against terrorism’ (Australian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2003).  
 
 According to DFAT’s White Paper, Advancing the National Interest, 
‘Australia is committed to the international campaign to eliminate the global threat of 
terrorism because terrorism threatens Australians at home and overseas. Terrorist 
groups such as al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah attack our values’ (2003:1). In the 
lead up to the November 2001 federal elections the Australian Prime Minister, John 
Howard, had used the fear of terrorism as part of his successful re-election campaign.  
He announced that there was no way to be certain that terrorists were not among the 
illegal immigrants trying to enter the country by boat (Atkins, 2001). In a further 
move, in 2002, once re-elected, the federal government posted an anti-terrorist kit to 
all Australian households. Included in the pack was information on how to identify a 
terrorist and what to do in case of attack, or suspected attack. A hotline was also set 
up for citizens to report suspicious individuals or groups. Subsequently, in 2003, 
legislation has been passed to give the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 
(ASIO) greater powers in relation to terrorism.  
 
Also in 2003 the Australian government joined the U.S. - led ‘coalition of the 
willing’ and, in this capacity, sent troops into Iraq as part of the alliance’s invasion 
force. This move, itself divisive within the country, has further influenced public 
perceptions that Australia and Australian tourists are possible targets for a terrorist 
attack by Islamic extremists.  
 
  Sport Tourism 
 
Sport tourism has had an accelerated growth pattern since the latter part of the 
twentieth century (Standeven & DeKnop, 1999). In general terms a sport tourist is 
someone who visits a destination with the primary reason of participating in or being 
a spectator of sport. Hinch and Higham’s (2001: 56) definition of sport tourism 
succulently encapsulates these key aspects: ‘sport-based travel away from the home 
environment for a limited time, where sport is characterised by unique rule sets, 
competition related to physical prowess, and a playful nature.’ This definition of sport 
fits the characteristics of the matches played in the World Cup tournament.   
 
Gibson (1999) suggested that sport tourism encompasses three macro behaviours: 
participating (active sport tourism), watching (event sport tourism), and visiting or 
venerating famous sports-related attractions (nostalgia sport tourism). A substantial 
body of research has focussed on the active sport tourist, examining demographic 
information, travel patterns, and motivations (Gibson, Attle, & Yiannakis, 1998; 
Green & Chalip, 1998; Nogowa, Yamguchi, & Hagi, 1996; Tabata, 1992). Event sport 
tourism includes hallmark events, such as the Olympic Games and the World Cup, 
and ranges down to small scale, community-based sporting events. At the large-scale 
end of sport tourism, events such as the Olympic Games have been studied 
extensively (Warning, Toohey & Ching, 2001). There are definite links between 
tourists’ motivations for attending mega events and event organisers’ motivations in 
staging them.  Roche (2000) proposed that mega events themselves are charismatic 
spectacles, functional social rituals and products of rational calculation in providing 
benefits to the event organisers and the region in which they are staged.  
 
Because of the realisation of potential benefits that can result from hosting 
mega events, the number and scale of sport events has expanded greatly in recent 
years. Many cities, states and countries have capitalised on the propensity of sport 
spectators to travel the globe to play and watch sport, and used sports-related events 
to market destinations. For example, Kim Dae-Jung, the President of South Korea, 
saw the 2002 FIFA World Cup as ‘a chance for [Korea] to make the country prosper 
diplomatically, economically and culturally, in sectors like tourism and science’ 
(Korea now, 2001:41, quoted in McCormack, 2002: 39). 
 
The high return on investment makes sport tourism attractive to cities and 
countries, which can capitalize on sports in two ways; attracting existing events 
and/or creating their own events (Kelly, 2000). Much of the research on event sport 
tourists has been on assessing their economic impact (Irwin, Wang, & Sutton, 1996; 
Faulkner and Raybould, 1995). Gibson (1999) and Nogowa, Yamguchi, and Hagi 
(1996) commented that there have been relatively few studies in the area of event 
sport tourism that have focused on the tourist whose main purpose of travel was to 
attend sports events as spectators. Likewise, Van Leeuwen, Quick & Daniel (2002) 
found that very little research has been undertaken on customer satisfaction as it 
pertains to spectator sport.  
 
  While there has been substantial growth in sport tourism, its continued 
development is closely dependent on overcoming the negative issues impacting 
globalisation, especially in the high-stakes world of mega events where uncertainties 
can have dramatic and adverse consequences (Wicks, 2002). As sport is situated 
within global structures and processes it is therefore subject to the damaging effects of 
global events, such as 911, which also affected countless countries and other facets of 
the global society. Economies, political systems, social and community life have all 
suffered repercussions. Sport tourism around the world has felt the repercussions of 
this event on several levels that have been highly observable and far ranging in their 
consequences.  
 
International tours were cancelled or altered, especially in the immediate 
aftermath of the event, for example the Australian Rugby League team’s tour of 
England in December 2001, the New Zealand cricket tour to Pakistan in October 
2001, and golf’s Ryder Cup in September, 2001. Events have had to source more 
security personnel and implement more rigorous anti-terrorism measures, for example 
the Manchester 2002 Commonwealth Games, the 2002 Salt Lake City Winter 
Olympic Games and the Athens 2004 Summer Olympic Games. Although safety 
concerns appear to be diminishing it was made known that $US 225-250 million was 
spent on security at Salt Lake City, an amount more than double the 1996 Atlanta 
Olympics (Janofsky, 2002 in Wicks, 2002). 
 
Tourism associated organisations have felt the brunt of the decline in travel 
and this has had flow-on effects for sport, in that less tourists are incidentally around 
to attend minor events. However, dedicated sports tourists have reacted differently. 
One such example relates to the 2002 Salt Lake City Olympic Games.  
‘Two seemingly contradictory findings emerged from industry 
reports about the Olympics. First that cancellation for Olympic trips 
were minimal and second, tickets to many events remained even as 
late as six weeks prior to the start of the Games. These findings 
suggest that the highly committed sports fan made his or her plans to 
attend the event early and were going to attend irrespective of 9/11 
and related events. The surprising availability of tickets to most 
venues may be due to a lack of less committed fans or leisure 
travellers willing to attend’ (Wicks, 2002: 132). 
 
In a recent editorial comment in the Journal of Sport Tourism, John Zauhar 
(2002) noted that the traditional aspects of sport tourism management, those related to 
financial loss or risk, property and liability exposures are now being overshadowed by 
the ‘saboteur’ element.  Zauhar (2002:5) challenged that, ‘the “innocence” of the sport 
tourism atmosphere must continue to permeate and not be overcome by the 
“albatross” of terrorism.’ Attending large-scale sport events has been linked to 
ritualistic behaviour (Real, 1986), and research has found that Olympic Games 
spectators attended because nothing was as exciting as ‘being there’ (Delphy, 1996). 
The question is, in this uncertain environment, can major event organisers manage 
spectator risk whilst still retaining the ritualistic aspect and the excitement that sport 
spectators have come to expect? 
 
Customer Satisfaction and Expectations 
 
 The growing body of research examining why people attend sporting events 
and how satisfied they are with the experience has come from a range of disciplines, 
such as psychology, consumer behaviour, sociology and marketing (Funk & James, 
2001). Triadó, Aparicio and Rimbau (1999) note that many writers have connected 
customer satisfaction to the notion of ‘quality’ and propose that three fundamental 
models have been formulated to account for the role of quality in the construction of 
satisfaction in sport. These models are: the ‘perceived discrepancy model’; the 
cognitive theory approach; and a ‘high implication’ paradigm. The first model, 
developed by Nicosia (1974), sought to explain post-consumption satisfaction in 
terms of the discrepancy between customer expectations and the perceived quality of 
service provision they received.  
 
The second model, the cognitive theory approach, asserted that, in addition to 
the above, satisfaction was also a component of previous consumer expectations.  The 
third model, which has the greatest application for this study, has as its basis cognitive 
dissonance theory and perceived quality, which ‘suggests that after a very bad (or 
good) consumption experience, the psychological costs of adjusting the quality to 
previous expectancy may exceed the costs of modifying that experience’ (Triadó, 
Aparicio & Rimbau, 1999:3). Thus, ‘to understand customer satisfaction the research 
focus should be the perceived quality of the main elements of the offer’ (Triadó, 
Aparicio and Rimbau, 1999:3). This aligns with the findings of Hill and Green (2000: 
146) who note that ‘attention has turned to the role that the facility and its service 
elements play in fan behaviour and satisfaction’. Similarly, Westerbeek and Shilbury 
(1999) observed that the facility (stadium) is the primary means by which sport is 
produced, consumed and delivered to spectators and so facility services are core 
determinants of satisfying spectator needs. They noted that such ‘servicescapes’ 
should be designed to enhance the entertainment element.  However, Hill and Green 
also cautioned that ‘it is inadequate to limit the focus to the spectators’ experience at 
the stadium. The experience needs to be understood in terms of the characteristics of 
fanship that the spectator brings to the event’ (Hill & Green, 2000:159). 
 
A study by Canter, Comber and Uzzel (1989) found ‘that the main reasons 
why football spectators stopped going to the game were the occurrence of violence 
and the lack of safety at the ground’ (quoted in Westeerbeek and Shilbury, 1999:8). 
They noted there were differences between fanatical supporters and occasional 
supporters. It was the latter category which was more likely to lose interest in 
attending if any part of the sportscape was not attractive, for example, their perception 




While the term ‘terrorism’ was first coined during the French Revolution no 
single definition of terrorism has gained current universal acceptance (United States 
Department of State, 2001). Most researchers tend to believe that an objective and 
internationally accepted definition of terrorism can never be fully agreed upon, as any 
definitive classification of what constitutes a terrorist act is fundamentally motivated 
by self-interest, open to interpretation, personal perception and exploitation. 
Conversely, others say that a definition of terrorism is necessary and a prerequisite to 
serious efforts to combat it (Ganor, 2001). The absence of agreement on a single, 
unequivocal meaning has resulted in a number of far ranging consequences; from the 
fact that that legislating against terrorism is problematic (Whitaker, 2001), to the 
reality that liberation movements have been pejoratively branded as terrorist 
movements by those opposing them (Freedman, 2002). Thus the search for what 
constitutes an acceptable definition of terrorism has vexed the United Nations for 
over 30 years.  
 
Despite this impasse, it is accepted that terrorism: has always been purposeful; 
is political in its motives; implies violence or threats thereof; is indiscriminate in its 
choice of targets; as well as being designed to have consequences beyond its 
immediate target/s (Freedman, 2002).  Thus, there is a strategy behind terrorist 
actions. The significant intent is that terrorism is politically motivated. ‘This is what 
distinguishes it from… murder or football hooliganism’ (Whitaker, 2001 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/elsewhere/journalist/story/0,7792,487098,00.html).  
 
While terrorism has many aims and forms Selth (1988) has classified it into 
four broad groupings (although some examples of terrorist acts can involve more than 
one of these categories): domestic (actions by groups or individuals against others in 
the same country); state (terror used by authorities to maintain their position within a 
nation); international (terrorism directed at foreign nationals or governments); and 
state sponsored (terrorist tactics used by agents of the state, or independent groups to 
pursue foreign policy aims.  
 
Sport and terrorism 
 
 To date, the study of sport violence has focused on either fan or spectator 
behaviour. Little work has been carried out on ‘actual or threatened acts of violence 
that may be associated with sporting practices and cultures, but not directly prompted 
by action on the playing field’, such as terrorism (Atkinson and Young, 2000: 54). 
Despite the fact that sport has not been immune from terrorist activities, ‘specialist 
literature on the relationship between sport and terrorism is rare’ (Wedermeyer, 
1999:218). 
 
According to Atkinson and Young (2000: 54): 
While sports may seemingly share few conceptual links with acts of 
terrorism… we cannot ignore how sports events may become targets 
of terrorism… or the contexts of terrorism…. For many reasons, 
individual terrorists or terrorist organizations might find suitable 
targets in athletes participating in games, spectators attending the 
events, or selected corporate sponsors of sports contests.’ 
 Thus, understandably, the more prestigious the sporting event, the greater the 
likelihood that terrorism will become an issue. Therefore, the Olympic Games and 
other mega sporting events, such as the football World Cup, have historically been 
considered to be prime targets, especially since the late 1960s, when technological 
advances to the media, through the use of satellites, enabled these events to be 
broadcast worldwide. This allowed protestors a global real-time audience to publicise 
their message. As the terrorism expert Brian Jenkins explained in 1974, ‘terrorism is 
theatre’ (Council on Foreign Relations, 2003).   
 
 
The most notorious example of terrorism in sport occurred in 1972 at the 
Munich Olympic Games, when members of the Palestinian group, ‘Black September’ 
infiltrated the Olympic Village and stormed the Israeli team quarters, killing a Israeli 
wrestling coach and taking 10 other Israeli athletes and officials hostage. A disastrous 
rescue was attempted in which all of the Israelis, a German policeman and a number 
of the terrorists died. As a result of the deaths, four nations (Egypt, Israel, Algeria and 
the Philippines) withdrew from the Games, as well as individuals from the Dutch and 
Norwegian teams.  The Israeli Government called for the cancellation of the Games, 
however the IOC decided that ‘the Games must go on’ (Brundage, 1972 in Toohey & 
Veal, 2000).  Since this time security at the Games has become a priority of the 
organisers. Nevertheless, despite all precautions, terrorism at the Games has not been 
totally eliminated.  
 
Security for Olympic athletes and officials has been greatly improved since 
Munich. However, at the 1996 Atlanta Games, a new form of Olympic terrorism 
appeared, this time in the form of a bomb blast aimed to kill and/or injure spectators.  
A bomb, hidden in a knapsack, exploded early in the morning of Saturday, 27 July in 
Olympic Centennial Park. One spectator was killed, a journalist covering the event 
died of a heart attack and over 100 others were injured in the attack (Toohey & Veal, 
2000). Despite extensive investigations the terrorist/s have not been brought to justice.  
 
The last Olympic Summer Games were held in Sydney in 2000. As part of the 
security planning an Olympic Intelligence Centre was created within the organizing 
committee. It provided a link to the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 
(ASIO) and provided intelligence-based risk management that identified and 
prioritised all Games-related risks (Toohey, 2001). 
 
Among a range of security principles for the Sydney Games the following 
measures were undertaken: 
• ensuring  that Olympic related international entry and accreditation processes 
were consistent with Australia’s existing policies  
• making certain all accredited persons were subjected to appropriate 
background checking  
• restricting sensitive areas to accredited persons  
• sanitising all Olympic venues and sites for the presence of explosive devices 
after ‘lockdown’  
• imposing targeted screening procedures, using metal detectors and searches of 
hand-carried items for all spectators entering Olympic venues and sites  
• checking all people and items entering higher risk areas such as the Olympic 
Village  
• imposing strict and consistent controls on the entry of vehicles and 
commercial materials into all Olympic venues and sites’ (Toohey, 2001) . 
 
 
 While security threats were generally considered to be slight, given 
Australia’s internal and external relationships at the time and the security preparations 
undertaken, there were still considered to be four potential sources of attack: ‘state 
agents of terror, formalized terrorist groups, loosely affiliated extremists and lone 
militants’ (www.terrorism.com/analysis-olympics.shtml, 2000: 1). Each of these was 
considered to be a unique type of threat, necessitating a different response.  
 
 
There were two terrorist related incidents pre Games time. In May 2000, a 
man whose home was discovered packed with explosives was arrested near the 
Olympic site and then the following month Australian authorities deported five people 
linked to extremist groups. Interestingly, in light of subsequent events, Islamic 
extremists, especially groups associated with Bin Ladin, such as al-Qaeda, were listed 
as one of the loosely affiliated extremists threats (www.terrorism.com/analysis-
olympics.shtml, 2000). 
 
While there was no recorded instances of terrorism at the 2002 FIFA World 
Cup, international football, including previous World Cups have been negatively 
affected by violence, much of it related to politics. The July 1969 Honduras El 
Salvador War, referred to as the ‘Football War’, was attributed in part to football. 
When the two countries met in a World Cup qualifying match, the game triggered a 
war. Long-standing feuds were played out on the pitch, and violence between fans 
escalated into a full-scale military clash between the countries 
(http://www.megastories.com/mitch/map/salvador.htm, 2003). This perhaps the most 
obvious, but by no means the only example of nationalistic football related hostility. 
Much of this aggression has links to the processes of globalisation. For example, 
substantial numbers of male football fans have been sport tourists now for over three 
decades, partly as a result of the development of package tours and cheap 
international holidays. These latter tourist initiatives have resulted in travel costs 
falling and flights becoming more readily available. ‘For many (especially) ‘working 
class’ young men, it was football that first initiated them into ‘foreign’ travel’ (Taylor, 
2002: 27). It is no coincidence that during this period, many football sports tourists 
have displayed violent behaviour at foreign games.  
 
 For example, during the last two World Cup Finals in Europe (Italia ’90 and 
France ’98) a number of incidents of fan violence occurred, and similar to the terrorist 
incidents at the Olympic Games, the scenes were played out on world television. 
Taylor suggests that a large part of this problem was politically motivated. 
‘The embarrassment that hooliganism inflicted on the [English] 
nation as a whole goes back thirty years or more… It became 
increasingly apparent throughout the 1990s (once English clubs were 
allowed back into European competition) that the worst fans were 
with the national team. The Clubs seemed to experience few 
difficulties travelling away to Europe… but every time the England 
team played abroad in serious competition there was trouble. 
‘Nationalism’ was proving a driving force for disorder; a platform on 
which the worst aspects of Englishness were regularly paraded. 
(Taylor, 2002:32-33). 
 
The authorities have not been idle in attempting to deal with this problem. The 
recent ‘gentrification’ of the game in Great Britain, as it attempts to capture a more 
upmarket fan base, has increased the incentives to management and governments to 
face up to and solve the issue. The negative implications for continued violence are 
far reaching, as the FIFA World Cup is the world’s biggest sporting event, with a 
television audience larger than that of the Olympics (Horne & Manzenreiter, 2002). 
Australia has indicated that it is interested in bidding for the 2014 World Cup. Thus, 
understanding the effects of terrorism on a World Cup will have particular 
significance within an Australian setting. 
 
The 2002 World Cup 
 
Amidst debates and discussions about safety and security in the post 9/11 
atmosphere many sports events went ahead as scheduled and were considered to be 
profitable from both sport and tourism perspectives. An example of this was the FIFA 
2002 Football World Cup. This mega event, held between 31 May and 30 June, was 
jointly hosted by the Republic of Korea and Japan. It was the first World Cup 
awarded to Asia and also the first to have two hosts.   
 
Despite intense political competition and rivalry during the bidding, 
organisational and construction phases of the event, the final result was an 
achievement that both host nations and FIFA considered highly successful. 
Additionally, both countries’ teams could be considered to have had successful 
tournaments. The Korean national team became the first-ever Asian country to reach 
the semi-finals in the history of World Cup. In all, more than 2.7 million spectators 
visited soccer stadiums in the two host countries for the 64 matches played over the 
one-month period (2002 FIFA World Cup, 2002). Games were equally divided 
between the two hosts, with 32 games played in each country. 
 
The soccer legacy to the Asian region, as a result of the successes of the 
tournament in general and the host countries’ teams should provide a strong platform 
to strengthen the game at both amateur and professional levels. The facilities built, 
especially those that were multi-purpose in their design, will be able to host numerous 
sport events in the future and it is hoped that they will also be a major draw-card for 
domestic sport tourists as both countries invested huge amounts into the construction 
of these venues. An estimated $US 4.7 billion was invested in sport facilities at the 20 
designated venues (Manzenreiter & Horne, 2002). The economic and image related 
benefits from the investment in hosting the event were important to both countries, 
given their long history of intense hostility. In the case of Korea, it was predicted that  
‘the economic benefits from the World Cup will serve as platform and springboard for 
South Korea to shape its image as a global player and shed its insular past’ (Wall 
Street Journal, 2002, 21 June in Republic of Korea, 2002b: 2). The Korean 
government expressed the hope that ‘the football fever that has consumed the country 
will remain an intrinsic force in Korea and serve as a foundation for building stronger 
ties with neighbours such as China and Japan especially through sports exchanges’ 
(Republic of Korea, 2002a: 13). 
 
After 9/11 and before the tournament began one of the greatest fears and 
subsequently one of the areas that required the greatest attention of both the event 
organisers and the national governments of the two host countries was the threat that 
terrorism would disrupt the event. ‘As the stakes for the host nation or region rise with 
increased travel flows and hopes for positive carry-over effects, so does the need to 
accurately plan for such major occurrences’ (Wicks, 2002: 126). The likelihood of 
decreased tourist numbers, the cost of additional security measures and the reaction of 
the spectators to high levels of security checks were all issues that had to be 
adequately managed by organisers and governments alike.   
 
Terrorism and the 2002 Football World Cup 
 
Before the attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 the 
security planning for the 2002 World Cup had concentrated on measures to deal with 
hooligans. According to Taylor (2002:32), for the English, the prospect of fighting on 
the streets of a former wartime foe (Japan) – was inviting. He noted that ‘it is no 
accident that England’s fans are most provoked by opponents who used to be real 
enemies’. However, despite this vulnerability, after 9/11, terrorism prevention and 
surveillance became the organisers’ primary security concern (Asahi Evening News, 
2002.  
 
Indeed, so involved was the anti-terrorist planning that the Cup’s security 
measures became the strictest for any sporting event to date. Korean and Japanese 
security organizations, aided by the United States’ FBI and Britain’s MI5 and MI6, 
were involved in pre-games anti-terrorist planning. During the event, fighter jets 
patrolled no-fly zones around the stadiums, while surface-to-air missiles were ready to 
shoot down suspicious aircraft. Sharpshooters were in place at all venues, and, in 
addition to the normal security measures, undercover operatives, some trained by the 
Israeli intelligence agency, Mossad and assisted by Israeli Army specialists, were on 
the lookout for suicide bombers (Sunday Age, 2002). No major terrorist incidents 
occurred during the event. 
 
However, while the security needed to be tight and thorough, there were also 
concerns that overtly stringent security could dampen the mood of the event and 
lessen spectators’ enjoyment (Asahi Evening News, 2002)  These tensions then 
became a question of balance: how much security needed to be provided without 
destroying the communal experience that the competition represented? (The 
Washington Post, 2002). 
 
The threat of terrorism also impacted on the event in a number of other ways, 
for example, the cost of insuring the event rose dramatically (Horne & Manzenreiter, 
2002). In addition, the predicted number of overseas spectators coming to watch the 
tournament was reduced, as were the subsequent tourism flow on effects after the 
World Cup (an expected and anticipated legacy of modern mega events). However, 
there were also other causes of this downturn. A recession was beginning and travel 
demand was declining before 9/11. ‘Even in the best of circumstances, the role played 
by airlines and aircraft in a tragic incident would have significantly impacted travel 
patterns particularly for the non-essential or leisure travel market… above all 
industrial sectors tourism has been impacted the most’ (Wicks, 2002: 129). 
 
Tourist arrivals to South Korea were down by five percent in the month of the 
event, despite predictions that the World Cup would attract record numbers of visitors 
to the country. While tourist numbers were less than anticipated before 9/11, the event 
still attracted a significant number of spectators who were willing to travel. This was 
not an unexpected turn of affairs. While the early planning for the event was 
optimistic about the crowds that the World Cup would draw, the advent of 9/11 
caused a major reassessment of these early predications. The Korean Ministry of 
Culture and Tourism lowered the anticipated number of foreign visitors in June 2002, 
to 460 000 from the original target of 640 000. A ministry official noted: ‘there, 
however, still exists a World Cup boom in the tourism industry, although the number 
of foreign visitors did not rise as much as we originally expected. The market 
diversification will eventually lead to a steady increase in the number of foreign 
tourists visiting the country in the near future after the World Cup events’ (Online 
Asia Times, 2002). Korean officials hoped that foreign media's extensive coverage of 
the World Cup, including the strong performance of the Korean team, the scenes of 
millions of red-shirt-clad people cheering in streets in an orderly manner, together 
with other positive images of Korean society and culture, would assist in attracting 
foreign tourists on a mid- and long-term basis.  
 
Despite a decrease in predicted World Cup tourist numbers, there was still an increase 
of 12 percent and 10 percent for American visitors during June/July respectively, and 
an increase of 55 percent and 18 percent for European visitors in June/July 2002. 
Sport tourists who decided to travel to the event, despite the threat of terrorism, were 
surveyed for this paper to better understand spectator experiences of an event by 
understanding perceptions of safety and responses to security measures. 
  
Method 
Tourists traveling to or within South Korea to attend the 2002 World Cup were 
surveyed about their reactions, motivations and feelings about the security and safety 
measures at the event. The sample was selected from self-identified 2002 FIFA World 
Cup spectators in South Korea employing a convenience sampling procedure. The 
survey was administered by research-trained students from the College of Hotel and 
Tourism at Kyunghee University. Students who were fluent in Japanese and Chinese 
conducted the survey for Japanese and Chinese participants, whereas those students 
with fluency in English administered the survey to English speaking tourists. The 
survey was conducted during the World Cup period at the major stadiums in Seoul, 
Suwon, and Incheon. The data collection was also conducted at the departure gates of 
the major international airport at Incheon. At these venues research assistants 
approached World Cup attendees and asked them if they would like to complete a 
short questionnaire on their experiences as a sport tourist. If they agreed they were 
either provided with the questionnaire to self-complete in a choice of Korean, 
Japanese, and Chinese, or the field researchers completed the questionnaire via 
personal interview. Of the questionnaires distributed 277 were fully completed.  
 
The survey instrument was initially written in English and then translated into 
the three languages. It had four demographic questions, two questions on pattern of 
game attendance, three general questions on perceptions of how issues of security and 
safety effected their decision to travel to the event. The security items were measured 
on a five-point Likert scale labelled strongly disagree and strongly agree at the poles 
and neutral at the mid point, using a set of eight items asking about their experiences 
of the event. There were also three open-ended questions providing respondents the 
opportunity to write additional comments about security issues, or safety related 
suggestions for future events. The sample represented respondents from 18 countries. 
The majority of these were from Korea (44.4 %), Japan (20.6%) and China (11.6%) as 
indicated in Table 1. The mean age of respondents was 31 years. Fifty-seven percent 
were male and 43 percent female. Seventy-three percent of respondents had 
completed university education.  




An examination of the participation patterns of the respondents revealed that 
some 46 percent had only attended one game in Korea, with the remaining 54 percent 
having been to more than one game. Most of the respondents had travelled to watch 
the World Cup matches and support the Korean team (54%), followed by supporters 
for China (8%), Japan (7%) and Germany (6%). The most common group size of 
these tourists was three people (44%), then two (22%) and alone (20%) with the mean 
group size 2.6.   
 
Nearly 85 percent of respondents were not worried about issues of security 
surrounding their attendance at the World Cup. Only 10 percent had considered not 
coming to the World Cup because of security related concerns and only 1 percent 
expressed an extremely high level of concern. The reasons that respondents gave for 
not being worried included: ‘I do not worry because security was tightened’; ‘because 
I may not watch the world cup again’; and ‘I like to watch the team.’ While there 
were only a small number that indicated higher levels of concerns, they travelled to 
the event despite these apprehensions. Some of the open-ended comments about the 
reason for this were; ‘recommendation by boyfriend; and ‘recommendation by 
husband’. Only 15 percent reported that their families were concerned about their 
attendance.  
 
Most respondents (76%) felt either safe or very safe with the security 
measures taken by the event organisers. Respondents reported that they perceived 
security measures were most visually apparent at the stadia and the airport, with 
police presence on transport, and the army at accommodation sites (in descending 
order of the level of obviousness). In terms of the areas at which respondents felt 
safest, the respondents felt safest at the stadium and least safe at their accommodation 
(Table 2). 
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
Only a small minority of respondents (6%) thought that the security measures 
put in place for the event detracted from their level of enjoyment. Conversely, 22 
percent enjoyed their sport tourist experience and stated that the heightened and 
obvious level of security enhanced their time in Korea. This is represented in 
comments such as, ‘if terrorists are not effectively controlled I would not come to 
Korea’, and ‘I feel the Korean army and police made me very safe’. Some 70 percent 
were unaffected either way. In terms of group size, it was only the sport tourist 
respondents who travelled in groups of five or less felt that the security lessened their 
enjoyment of the event. 
 
Analysis of the data by gender, nationality, and age revealed few significant 
differences in perceptions of security measures. However, there were two areas in 
which there was a significant difference. Firstly, Chinese and American tourists were 
more likely to report that they felt the high level of security was attractive. Secondly, 
the domestic tourists (Koreans) were the only nationality group that indicated the 
security detracted from their experience at the World Cup. The Korean respondent 
comments reflected a feeling that they should not be subjected to the same security 
measures as foreign tourists. Their remarks included, ‘security check for foreign 
tourist arrivals only’, and ‘limit to foreign tourist’. 
 
Respondents were provided with the opportunity to write general comments 
about their perceptions about security for the event and their level of enjoyment of 
their World Cup experience. Of those who chose to complete this section the most 
frequent comments were centred on the fact that this was a once in a lifetime 
experience, so they did not really give security concerns much priority in their 
decision to attend the event. ‘Most people ignore the possibility of these happening 
and enjoy the sport’ (Japanese female, 25 years old, supporter of Japanese team) was 
one comment which supported the notion of the sport tourists being focussed on the 
event and not placing much emphasis on terrorism.  Comments such as, ‘I feel the 
Korean army and police made me very safe’ (Chinese female, 31 years old, supporter 
of Chinese team), and ‘good security’ (New Zealand, 28 years old, supporter of 
Turkey) were common. Other respondents, including males and females from Japan, 
China, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Canada and Korea, made similar comments. This 
suggests that these sport tourists felt comfortable with the level of safety provided by 
the host country. A number of respondents commented that any more security would 
be invasive, (including 6 males from Korea, 1 male from Japan and 2 Korean 
females). A male, aged 24 years, from the United States a supporter of the Korean 
team wrote: ‘we are here for watching soccer. So I do not want police to stay here’. A 
25 year old Japanese male supporter of the Japanese team commented that: ‘more 
tight security control will be rather harmful’. 
There was a question asking if the respondents had any suggestions about 
security measures for future sport events, given their experience of the 2002 World 
Cup. Most responses to this question were proposals about increasing the number of 
police without appearing too militaristic. Other suggestions about the event 
organisation were related to: increasing the level of communication to spectators 
about the security and safety measure in place; ensuring that this information was in 
appropriate languages so that all tourists could access it; educating the people coming 
to the event on security measures; better (clearer) identification of security personnel; 
and less control on the cheering materials brought into the games. 
  
The final section of the questionnaire asked respondents to comment on the 
impact of terrorism on sport events. The responses to this question were wide ranging. 
The most frequent response was that many people were more anxious and nervous 
about attending major events because of the perceived threats to safety. This is 
evidenced in the following responses, ‘I cannot enjoy sport activities’ (Chinese, 
female aged 30 years supporting the Chinese team), ‘it gives sport lovers pain’ 
(Chinese male aged 36 years, supporting the Chinese team) and two Korean 20 year 
old males, supporting the Korean team, stated; ‘it promotes unrest’. The next most 
frequent response was related to the negative impact of terrorism on sport tourism, as 
people were less likely to travel to watch the event. 
 
Other comments suggested that sport could be used to combat terrorism, 
‘world sport events are very useful against terrorism’, (Japanese males, aged 31 years, 
supporting the Korean team) through to opinions that the two should be kept separate, 
‘sport is sport, do not make bad use of sport as politics’, (Korean male, aged 48 years, 
supporting the Korean team) ‘sport and politics are totally different’ (Japanese male, 
36 years old, supporting the Japanese team) and ‘sport and politics should not mix’ 
(Korean male, aged 25 years, whose team allegiance was not identified). Some 
respondents felt that there was no danger, ‘terrorists do not target sport’ (Italian 
males, aged 46 years, supporting the Italian team), and ‘most people ignore the 
possibility of these happening and enjoy the sport’ (Australian female, aged 49 years, 




The impact of hallmark events such as the World Cup is usually measured on 
a multitude of indices including economic, tourism/commercial, physical, socio-
cultural, psychological and political impacts (Ritchie, 1984).  This paper has taken a 
rather different perspective and focused not on the impact of the event on the host 
country but rather on the impact of external threats of terrorism and spectators’ 
perceptions of safety and responses to security measures. 
 
While all FIFA World Cup events impart significant impacts due to the sheer 
size of the event and its widespread global attention, the 2002 World Cup faced quite 
a different type of scrutiny coming so soon after a major act of terrorism. The decision 
of supporters to travel to attend matches and partake in the associated activities took 
on a completely different dimension in light of the uncertainly about future terrorism 
targets.  The pressure on security was intense during this World Cup for different 
reasons to previous FIFA World Cups, which had concentrated on anticipating and 
preventing acts of soccer hooliganism on and off the fields of competition, and in city 
streets and entertainment venues. 
 
The event organisers were obliged to invest time and financial resources in 
security measures due to the inherent threat of terrorism. At the same time the 
organisers also had to ensure that the people travelling to watch and participate in the 
event were not overwhelmed by the heightened security to the extent that it detracted 
from their World Cup experience and their experience of Korea.  
 
 The findings of this survey conducted with visitors to the World Cup indicate 
that security was not a major factor in respondents’ decisions to attend the 2002 
World Cup, despite the events of 9/11. As only those who attended were surveyed, the 
data do not represent the opinions of people who decided not to travel to the event 
because of security concerns, it could be expected that some of the travellers would 
have been tentative about their ultimate decision to attend the event. The research 
found very few people indicated that they were in the latter category. The majority of 
respondents, dedicated sport tourists, replied that they were going to make the trip 
regardless of perceived security risk. Even though security was not significant in their 
decision to travel to the World Cup, once they were in the country a significant 
proportion was conscious of the safety measures undertaken by the organisers. In 
most cases the high levels of security were appreciated and did not detract from the 
attendees’ experience of the event.  The reported perceptions of the survey 
respondents were that the World Cup organisers successfully instituted tight security 
to prevent terrorism incidents and these measures did not detract from sport tourists 
enjoying the football competition. 
 
The survey results highlight a number of considerations that other sport event 
organisers might consider in relation to the uncertainly of terrorism threats.   It was 
apparent that for those who did decide to attend the World Cup it was important that 
they felt safe without the event becoming dominated by oppressive security measures.  
Increasing the number of police and associated security personnel without appearing 
too militaristic both eased spectators’ anxiety and allowed them the opportunity to 
enjoy the event.  In this respect the organisers could be judged as rising to Zauhar’s 
(2002) challenge of embracing ‘saboteur’ prevention and protecting sport tourists 
without detracting from their satisfaction and ultimate experience. 
 
It is also important that visitors are provided with a sufficient level of 
communication about the risk management measures put in place for the event. This 
information should be available in different languages and via a range of media; 
written, visual and verbal. Measures to educate tourists about security measures, and 
how to adhere to any specific safety requirements, also should be addressed. 
However, a balance is required to ensure that such measures do not detract from the 
event experience and compromise the reason that sport tourists choose to travel and 
attend the event. Therefore even seemingly mundane actions such as controlling 
cheering materials, for example flags and hooters, brought into the games, should be 
as unobtrusive as possible, as these items are often fundamental to spectators’ 
experience of the event. The sport spectator endeavours to maximise their experience 
through engaging in it with all their senses, dressing in team colours, cheering, 
shouting, clapping and waving flags. To diminish or constrain any of these 




These findings regarding the World Cup are particularly relevant to Australia 
because of the negative effects that 9/11, Bali bombings and the Iraq War have had on 
tourism in Australia. The resulting problems in tourism have led to government 
initiatives to rekindle the market, and capitalise on Sydney’s successful hosting of the 
2000 Olympic Games. In July 2003, the Federal Tourism Minister, Joe Hockey 
delivered a speech in Japan that was critical of the New South Wales state 
government for reducing its tourism budget by $A 3.3million. More importantly, he 
claimed that the city of Sydney was complacent and without any annual mega events. 
Significantly, in his 10 point plan for re-energising Australia’s tourism gateway were 
suggestions to: develop world class annual events; develop ‘purpose travel’ in high-
yield niche markets, for example sport tourism; and promote Sydney as a golf hub in 
Asia (Scala & Yamine, 2003). 
 
Sydney will be the focal point of the upcoming 2003 World Cup Rugby and 
the NSW government has formed a Major Events Board within the Premier’s 
Department. However, it is Melbourne, the capital of the state of Victoria that is 
regarded as the nation’s event capital. On an annual basis Melbourne stages the 
Australian Tennis Open, the Australian Formula One Grand Prix and the Melbourne 
Cup horse racing carnival. In addition, the city is hosting the 2004 World 
Championships for track cycling and hot air ballooning, the 2006 Commonwealth 
Games, and has recently been awarded the 2007 FINA World Swimming 
Championships.  
 
The reliance on an event-driven strategy for tourism revitalisation, in a climate 
of concern regarding terrorism, means that Australian event organisers need to ensure 
spectators’ safety while ensuring that they are satisfied by their experience. This study 
has examined the relationship between a sport tourist’s intention to travel to a sport 
event and their perceptions of safety and enjoyment while at the stadium.  These are 
attributes that future mega event organisers will need to be cognisant of in the current 
Australian climate of uncertainty and fierce competition between cities to achieve the 
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Table 1: Respondent nationality 
Nationality  Frequency  
Korean 123 44.4 
Japanese 57 20.6 
Chinese 32 11.6 
North & South American 19 6.9 
European 23 8.3 
Other Asian 12 4.3 
Australian 
& New Zealand 
7 2.5 
Other  4 1.4 
Total 277 100.0 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Pearson’s Correlations of Likert Items of Safety at 
Noted locations 
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-.303** -.559** -.238**   




-.442** -.265** -.361** .107  
6 Transport 
security   
3.568 1.27 -.191** -.164* -.276** -.350** -.129 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level  1=very safe, 5=unsafe 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level  
 
 
 
 
